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Abstract— Data centers accumulate corporate and personal
data at a rapid pace. Driven by economy of scale and the
high bandwidth of today’s network connections, more and more
businesses and individuals store their data remotely. Server
virtualization is an important technology to facilitate this process,
allowing dedicated hardware to be turned into resources that
can be used on demand. However this technology is still under
development and therefore, in spite of its increasingly important
role, the overall security impact of virtualization is not yet
completely known.
To remedy this situation, we have performed a systematic liter-
ature review on virtualization, and decomposed the virtualization
technology into distinct features, which are dependent on each
other, but also have individual positive and negative effects on
security.
Our study shows that, given adequate management, the core
virtualization technology has a clear positive effect on availability,
but that the effect on confidentiality and integrity is less positive.
Virtualized systems tend to lose the properties of location-
boundedness, uniqueness and monotonicity. In order to ensure
corporate and private data security, we propose to either remove
or tightly manage non-essential features such as introspection,
rollback and transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Server virtualization, running many virtual servers on one
physical machine, has become widespread in recent years.
Benefits include reduced power consumption, lower hardware
costs, as well as easier management. As for security, claimed
improvements are the increased availability of applications
and the isolation of processes. However, virtualization gives
much more possibilities. With introspection, the inside of
a virtual machine can be examined, intervention gives the
ability to modify a running virtual machine. Furthermore,
physical servers equipped with virtualization software can now
be linked to each other, creating a whole new virtualization
infrastructure, making it possible to move virtual machines
from one physical server to another, while they are running.
Virtualization also has security drawbacks, such as exploitable
weaknesses in virtualization software, the existence of covert
channels and the possibility of new types of malware. How-
ever, apart from these distinct threats, not so much is known
about the overall security effect of virtualization. This is a
serious issue, because virtualization is an important technology
for data centers, Web 2.0 applications and new forms of
on-demand or “cloud” computing. In order to understand
the security impact of those technologies, it is necessary to
understand the security impact of the virtualization technology
as a whole. Under which circumstances does virtualization
improve security, and under which does it pose a threat?
A first step towards answering these questions is to dis-
tinguish between different features of virtualization and show
their interactions. In this paper we present a model consisting
of five groups of features: (1) virtualization capable hardware,
(2) virtual machines, (3) management of virtual machines,
(4) management of physical servers running virtualization
software, and (5) emergent behavior. Based on a systematic
literature review, we aggregate the literature on the impact
of virtualization for each feature with respect to different
security properties and show how these features fit together.
We conclude with an overview of how the security benefits
can be maximized, from both a technical and a management
point of view.
II. BACKGROUND ON VIRTUALIZATION
A. Types of virtualization
Generally, virtualization is a software layer that implements
a (hardware) architecture. This layer provides a consistent
interface that can be used to decouple software systems from
the hardware on which they are running, making them more
portable and providing easier management. Different types of
components can be virtualized. For example, with resource
virtualization, multiple harddisks are combined to one virtual
disk, whereas with machine virtualization, the instruction set
of a CPU architecture is emulated on a real physical machine.
Likewise, network virtualization can use a physical switch to
create virtual network compartments. With respect to virtual
machines (VMs), the abstraction layer is called virtual machine
monitor (VMM). The VMM controls the VMs running on top
of it. There are different types of VMMs and a taxonomy
can be found in Smith and Nair. [1] In their terms, the Java
Virtual Machine is of type process virtual machine, because
it allows individual processes to run. In contrast, XenServer
is a system virtual machine because entire operating systems
(guests) can be run on top of it. System virtual machines
can be further split into hosted VMMs (that run on top of
another host operation system) and classic VMMs (that run
on the bare hardware). Often, system VMMs also involve
network virtualization, as the network connections between
virtual machines can be configured in the VMM. Classic
virtualization is often called server virtualization. VMMs can
also be joined together, resulting in a virtualized infrastructure.
In this infrastructure, capabilities such as load balancing and
the transfer of virtual machines between different physical
servers are managed from a central location. We call this
infrastructure and its management the “VMMM”, an acronym
for virtual machine monitors’ management.
In this paper, we focus on system virtual machines of the
classic type, and for the remainder of this paper we will simply
use the terms terms VM, VMM, VMMM, and virtualization
when discussing system virtualization technologies 1.
B. Similarities with other technologies
VMMMs resemble computer clusters, computing grids and
mainframes2. These systems are also comprised of multiple
disks and processors, forming a logical whole. The security
characteristics of virtualization are therefore also relevant for
these types of computing. A notable difference is that a cluster
is more often designed as a complete physical unit, whereas
VMMMs are created ad hoc, out of existing machines that are
spread geographically. Utility or cloud computing can use any
of these technologies, treating servers simply as resources, that
can be used for data storage and processing, regardless of their
physical location. For example, Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) is known to be using the Xen VMM.[4, p. 5]
C. Usage of virtualization
To evaluate the effects of virtualization, we distinguish
between different types of usage. In the literature, several types
of usage are found:
1) Software testing: a testbed is created with virtual ma-
chines.
2) Software evaluation: untrusted software is evaluated in a
virtual machine. The VM thus functions as a “sandbox”
from which the software cannot escape.
3) Running production applications: a business’s applica-
tions are placed inside VMs.
4) Desktop virtualization: rather then giving employees
physical PCs, enterprises can provide them with a per-
sonal VM running on a central server.
5) Running an intrusion detection system (IDS): here, the
VM also serves as a sandbox, often called “honeypot”.
Attackers breaking into the VM will not be able to go
any further, and their behavior can be monitored.
6) Running cross-platform applications: an application de-
veloped for a specific OS is placed inside a VM, such
that it can be run on a different OS (for example running
a Windows application on a Mac).
7) Debug and replay: VMMs such as ReVirt [5] can replay
and log actions of virtual machines. When a VM is
infected with a virus, its actions can be studied, simply
by replaying its execution.
1VMWare’s ESX is a hybrid form because it is based on a Linux kernel [2],
but was examined in the study.
2An early application of virtualization was IBM’s System/360 main-
frame [3].
8) Software distribution: software can be installed on one
virtual machine, which can be distributed as virtual
appliance, requiring few configuration changes. [3]
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on the secu-
rity effects for running production applications, because here
security concerns are the greatest.
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
A. Research design
The literature study is based on the method described by
Webster and Watson. [6] Here, literature on a certain topic is
retrieved from well-known sources such as leading journals.
After this iteration, additional literature is found by tracing
back the cited papers and forward towards conferences papers
that cite the journal papers. Rather than discussing each
article or author separately, the findings are presented concept-
centric, meaning all literature on a certain concept is discussed
in one section. For this study, we began with a literature search
on Scopus3 yielding a total of 151 papers of which 46 were
relevant. Included journals were IEEE’s Computer as well as
Security & Privacy. Another notable source was the ACM
VMSec’08 workshop on virtual machine security. Literature
from other sources was also included, such as datasheets from
virtualization product vendors such as VMware.
The results are presented centered around specific features
of virtualization, linking to earlier research on feature in-
teraction in the telecommunications domain. There, a basic
phone system is extended with different features such as call
forwarding and on-hold. When used together, these features
can cause interactions with either desirable or undesirable
consequences. [7]
Decomposing virtualization has several benefits: firstly, the
literature consists mainly of distinct security claims, arguing
how a specific feature affects security in a certain context.
These claims can be aggregated together for each feature.
By grouping claims together for each feature, and analyzing
them, we improve the understanding of the feature’s effect and
can identity the more fundamental effects. Secondly, regarding
those claims that are not attributed to a specific feature, but
rather virtualization as a whole, we can attempt to trace their
effects back to specific features. Thirdly, the feature interaction
model allows us to detect previously unknown interactions
between features and their security consequences.
Obviously, a complex technology such as virtualization can
be split up in many ways, and each choice is to some extent
arbitrary. For this model, we used the following guidelines:
1) For something to be considered a feature, it should
represent a distinct piece of functionality, characteristic
or architecture, having a unique impact on security, if
only on availability.
2) Existing decompositions found in the literature should
be used as much as possible: care was taken to limit
the introduction of new terminology. In some cases we
introduced features that are not previously covered in the
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literature. For example, we could not find any discussion
on the power features of virtualization (functions to
switch a VM on an off). These have a distinct effect
on availability.
3) Features that are present in specific implementations can
be excluded: we are interested in common virtualization
features, not in the complete feature list of one particular
vendor.
For each feature, we present the security effects, together with
several key references. In case effects were listed in more
than one paper, we only reference to a key publication. When
no direct security effects were found, such as in the case of
the power functions, we added analytical claims based on the
literature studied. Obviously, these claims should be the focus
of further research.
B. Conceptual model
Virtualization technology consists of features, which are
divided into five groups:
1) features of virtualization capable hardware
2) features of VMs
3) features of individual VMMs
4) features of VMMMs
5) features arising from unintended interaction between
features
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the groups. The
hardware (1) enables virtualization, several VMs (2) run on
top of a group of VMMs (3) and the VMMs are managed by
a VMMM(4), leading to emergent features (5).
(3) VMM VMMVMM
(4) VMMM
(2) VM VM
(5) 
Emergent
features
(1) Hardware
VM VM
Fig. 1. Groups of virtualization features
The threat model used in this paper is essentially a white
box, no component of the virtualization technology is trusted.
As such, we depart from earlier threat models created by
Vaarela [8] and VMware [2] that assume trusted components
and are therefore unsuitable for the study of the inner workings
of virtualization technology. Since we are considering securing
production applications, the ultimate security objective is to
protect the application running inside a VM. In our model,
threats to this application can originate from five different
components: (i) hardware, (ii) other VMs, (iii) VMMs, (iv)
VMMMs and (v) network.
Hardware threats are not discussed in this paper, because
these are mostly generic threats such as theft that are not
specifically relevant virtualization. More technical information
on virtualization hardware is available from Perez et al. [9]
Combined, this leads to the following model of threats
depicted in figure 2. Note that these attacks can be combined,
resulting in multi-step attacks. For example the attack Network VMM is a stepping stone for a more complicated attack
plan, such as Network  VMM  VM.
Threat source Explanation
Network  VMMM An outsider attacks the VMMM
Network  VMM An outsider attacks the VMM
Network  VM An outsider attacks the VM
VMMM  VMM A VMMM attacks a VMM
VMM  VM A VMM attacks a VM
VM  VM A VM attacks another VM
Fig. 2. Virtualization threats
IV. SECURITY IMPACT PER FEATURE GROUP
We now list what is currently known about the security
impact of all the different features per group. Security claims
in the literature are split over three categories: (i) analytical
claims, based on logical arguments, (ii) empirical claims,
based on experiments and (iii) claims based on mathematical
models. The first category was dominant. Only one paper fitted
into the third category, calculating the reliability of different
virtualization architectures. [10])
A. Features of hardware
We list two important hardware features below. For more
detailed information on other virtualization hardware issues,
we refer to Uhlig et al. [11] and Van Doorn [12].
1) Trap program execution: The essential hardware feature
enabling virtualization (present in all modern x86 hardware)
is the ability to trap the execution of a running process and
hand over control of the CPU to the VMM. [13] This allows
the VMM to intervene in the execution of the process. In such
a way, the VMM can perform two critical tasks: (i) emulate
certain hardware and (ii) isolate the virtual machine from other
running processes.
2) Trusted Platform Module: An optional hardware feature
is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which can be used
to verify that the proper VMM is indeed running, as opposed
to an insecure version installed by an attacker. [9]
B. Features of VMs
1) Store VM as image: VMs consist essentially of files,
on which the machine’s own data is stored, as well as some
metadata (for example, the amount of memory used, or the
number of CPUs)4. Storing this data as files allows easy
copying of the data by a VMM, with the drawback that
they can be inspected (breaching confidentiality) or modified
(breaching integrity).
4An overview of common VM data elements was created by the Distributed
Management Task Force (DMTF), an IT industry consortium. [14]
2) Modified VM software: For ease of use, the VMM
interface should be as transparent as possible: ideally a server’s
software should not need to be changed if the server is
virtualized. However, the OS running inside the VM can be
modified to provide better performance (paravirtualization [3]).
VMs have the ability to contact the VMM in order to execute
security checks, using so-called hooks. [15]
C. Features of individual VMMs
1) Small footprint: Software layers provide new oppor-
tunities for attack and for defense. Generally, the amount
of exploitable vulnerabilities is proportional to the amount
of code. [16] To get an indication of a VMM’s security, it
can be compared to the previous lowest layer, the operating
system (OS). From this viewpoint, the VMM provides the
opportunity for improved security because it is notably smaller.
For example, VMWare’s ESX fits into 32 Megabytes [17],
whereas a complete operating system such as Microsoft’s
Windows Vista can be several Gigabytes big. Thus, the chance
that an attack of a VM on an underlying VMM is successful is
probably lower than the chance that an attack of an application
on an OS is successful.
2) Hierarchical control: The VMM layer is designed to
control the VMs that run on top of it. Therefore it should
not be possible for code running inside the VM to “escape”
to the VMM and gain control over it. However, several
vulnerabilities have been detected in VMMs that might allow
for such an escape, in laboratory experiments [18] as well as
in production environments [19].
3) Isolation between processes: For normal operations,
different VMs running on one VMM cannot affect each other,
unless their interactions (network connections, file shares) are
explicitly specified in the VMM. Such a VMM provides better
isolation than an operating system, in which applications can
normally interact: if we put each application in its own OS
in a VM we reduce the chance of undesired interactions and
intrusions. [20] However, covert channels are still an issue
in existing VMM implementations. [16] A drawback is also
that conventional security mechanisms depending on network
access do not work well - a standard IDS cannot observe the
traffic on one physical machine between different VMs.
4) Logging: Virtualization can help to implement secure
logging: during the execution of the VM, the VMM collects
data and stores it in a place outside of the VM. Therefore it
cannot be altered by an exploit that is contained inside the
VM. Such a feature is implemented in ReVirt. [5]
5) Load balancing: VMMs can determine (and limit) the
CPU utilization and disk space that a VM uses. This prevents
a VM from starving the other VMs of resources.
6) Copy and backup VMs: Making backups and copies
of VMs is easier than making copies of data on physical
machines. Therefore, a defective VM can be easily replaced
by a working version.
7) Introspection: Since the VMM is placed at a lower level
than the VM, it has the ability to “look inside the VM”,
to see its data and monitor its execution. This process is
called virtual machine introspection. [21] The functionality
can be used to run security applications such as virus scanners,
intrusion detection systems such as Livewire [22], and policy
checkers. Because these are outside of the VM, the VM cannot
interfere with them. Security problems can be reported to the
management, who can shutdown or quarantine the VM.
8) Attestation: If an inspection of a VM is performed, the
VMM can send the results (the attestation) to another party.
Based on the results, the receiving party can authenticate the
VM, and decide whether to trust it. For optimal confidence,
this function is best used in combination with trusted hardware
(as in the Terra VMM [23]).
9) Interference: In some cases intrusions cannot just be
detected, but intervention may be possible: Once the VMM
detects a malicious program running inside a VM, its memory
can be altered, preventing its execution. [21]
10) Power functions: VMMs control the execution of a
VM, as if it would have a virtual power button. Commonly,
several functions are provided: start/power on, stop/power off,
pause/suspend and reboot/reset. These functions are useful to
increase availability, for example if a VM crashes, it can be
more easily rebooted than if it were a physical machine, and it
is also easier to limit resource usage by simply pausing VMs
that are not needed.
11) Networking: VMMs can configure the network, so that
a VM only communicates with predefined VMs, forming a
private network that does not require hardware changes. The
networking functions can also be used to monitor traffic, for
example running an intrusion detection system.
12) Rollback: Another feature that can be provided by a
VMM is to rollback actions of a VM. [24] For example
Microsoft Hyper-V has a feature to create a snapshot. [25]
If a problem is detected, the VM can be restored to an earlier
state.
13) VM Management: In order to manage the previously
described features, a user interface has to be provided to
control the VMM and the VMs that it runs. The management
can be done from another machine (virtual or physical). For
example Xen is designed to use a specific VM (“Dom0”) for its
management. [16] Obviously, this enlarges the small footprint
that was supposed to be a strong asset of the VMM.
D. Features of VMMMs
1) Transfer: A crucial feature of a VMMM is the ability to
transfer (”migrate”) running virtual machines between phys-
ical servers. If a physical machine undergoes maintenance,
the virtual machine running on top of it can be temporarily
moved to another physical machine. Several VMMs provide
this capacity (VMware ESX [26], XenServer [27]).
A problem is that the network ID (often the MAC address)
is reassigned randomly after the transfer, making it difficult
to identity the VM. [24] Some VMMs can retain the MAC
address during a live transfer. [26]
Oberheide et al. [28] demonstrated how to exploit the
transfer feature by modifying the VM in transit. Improper
management can also lead to the transfer of VMs to unsecure
hosts, to breaches of confidentiality and to denial-of-service
(DOS) attacks if too many virtual machines are migrated to
one VMM host.
2) Replication: Apart from being transfered, VMs can also
be replicated on different physical servers. [29] This is useful
to ward off a DOS attack, to distribute workload and to
cope with hardware failures. At the downside, replication and
transfer can be used to have VMs run on less secure locations,
as was the case for the transfer feature. Obviously, the security
of a VM is determined by all the physical hosts it has run on.
3) Load balancing: Features such as transfer and replica-
tion can be used for load balancing across different physical
machines, increasing the availability of applications.
4) Patching: Before virtualization, efficient use of re-
sources meant having multiple applications running on one
operating system. Since operating systems isolate applications
poorly from each other, a common approach is to put each
application in a separate VM, having a dedicated operating
system. This increases the number of operating systems,
because deployment of VMs is easy. Therefore, the process
of managing operating system patches becomes more critical.
A benefit of VMMs is that they can contain software to ease
the process of patching, such as VMware’s vCenter Update
Manager. [30] This software inspects VMs to check whether
they are fully patched. If patching is necessary, a snapshot can
be made of the system, after which the patches are installed.
If the patching fails, the VM can revert to the snapshot.
VMMs make it therefore extremely easy to rollback patches.
Thus, a failed patch can be removed, but this also holds
for a successful patch. Normally patching is a monotonic
process [24]: patches are applied in sequential order. This is
not necessarily true when a VMM is used: a VM that was
patched on a certain date might have its patch removed at a
later date. [31] At any given time, not all of the existing VMs
are running, some might be dormant for days or even weeks,
depending on the need. If such a VM is started, it will lack
the critical patches. [24]
When applications cannot be patched, they need to be
isolated from the network. Some VMMs provide specific
functionality for this case (for example ServerShield [32])
An additional issue is that VMMs themselves also have to be
patched [31], and this is more critical - if a VMM is breached,
the breach might be impossible to detect because the VMM
is the lowest layer of the IT stack.
5) VMM management: If several VMMs are linked to-
gether, their work needs to be coordinated from a special
server, such as vCenter from VMware [30]. This gives the
administrators enormous power, since they can control any
VMM and any VM running on it from a single point. Another
side effect is that the trusted code base is increased (similar
to the management domain for a single VM).
E. Features emerging from interactions
In the past sections, we have discussed many virtualization
features, some of which have a positive effect on security,
whereas others have a negative impact. In this section, we
aggregate these into three emerging features that were not
explicitely designed, but rather evolved from the interaction
between existing features. This high-level clustering helps to
understand the effects.
1) Loss of uniqueness of machines and data: In a non-
virtualized server environment, applications, servers and data
are to a great extent unique. However, the replication and
copy/backup features reduce the uniqueness of these.
2) Loss of location-boundedness of data: It is difficult to
ascertain the location of a certain VM [32], since it can move
between different physical servers, due to features such as
transfer, replication and backup. In fact this also holds for the
virtual location of a VM: if the networks are also virtualized,
a VM can be accidentally dragged-and-dropped outside of a
DMZ.
3) Loss of monotonicity of program execution: Virtuali-
zation technology causes a server’s history to stop being a
straight line. [24] Instead it becomes a graph, where branches
are made on replication and copy operations, and a previous
state can be reached when a restore is performed. Data cannot
be deleted easily, there can be many copies and the VM can
be restored to an earlier version. [24]
V. OVERALL IMPACT OF VIRTUALIZATION
The overall effects of virtualization technology depend not
just on the technology itself, but also on the environment in
which it is used. Conceptually we therefore split the causes
into three groups:
1) the technical capabilities of features and the dependen-
cies between them
2) the selection of features that can be made in practice
3) the management of the selected features in practice
The first aspect is illustrated in figure 4 where a summary
of all features and their effect on security is provided. For
each feature, we show its known effect on all five security
properties. A + sign indicates that the functionality provided
by the feature has a positive effect on security (compared
to a non-virtualized situation), without placing high demands
on the environment regarding management, whereas a −
indicates the opposite: the feature is technically vulnerable
or can be easily misused. Furthermore a ± indicates that the
security effect depends on the particular implementation or the
circumstances, or that the literature indicates both positive and
negative effects. Finally an empty cell indicates that we could
not find or deduce an effect on a security property. In the
threats column of figure 4 we can find which feature requires
strict management because it can be easily abused.
The dependencies between features in figure 3 shed light
on the second group, showing which features can be easily
altered or removed. As for the precise meaning of feature
dependencies, obviously we do not have the source code
available for all virtualization technologies to investigate the
real technical dependencies such as system calls. Therefore we
take a more practical approach: Given two features A and B, A
depends on B when logically it cannot function independently
from B without duplicating part of B’s functionality. To
keep the diagram clear, the dependencies of the management
features are not shown, but obviously, these depend on the
other features in the VMM and VMMM layer respectively.
A technological weakness can be mitigated by strong proce-
dural security, and vice versa can a secure technology be mis-
used in practice. Taking this into account, we have attempted
to present the overall security impact of virtualization, as can
be expected in practice for each of the five security properties
in the next sections.
A. Confidentiality
Virtualization threatens confidentiality in several ways.
First, the introspection feature gives the VMM the ability to
look inside the VM. This feature can be misused or attacked.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that VMs can be
transfered between different physical servers: after several
transfers, the confidentiality of the data might depend on the
security of many different physical servers, because data is
retained there in some form. Obviously, replication features
only make this problem worse.
B. Integrity
Together with the features of intervention and rollback
comes the ability to manipulate the state of a VM, which
threatens the integrity of the transactions done on a VM.
C. Availability
The availability of applications running on VMs will most
likely improve: VMs can be transfered for maintenance pur-
poses, restored when a failure occurs and replicated if the
workload requires it. (Cf. Jansen et al. [10]) However it
must be noted that virtualization is not without availability
risks, as was demonstrated by an attack on the virtualization
infrastructure of the web hosting company VAServe, where
100.000 sites were deleted [33].
D. Authenticity
Virtualization creates identification problems. If a VM is
duplicated there no longer is one original machine. Also, the
identity of the machine used for communications (such as the
MAC address) might change during a transfer. A possible
solution is to alter a VM in such a way that it depends
on a special piece of hardware, possibly using physically
unclonable functions, as proposed by Atallah et al. [34]
E. Non-repudiation
Since virtual machines can be duplicated, rolled back and
restored, there seems to be a fundamental problem regarding
non-repudiation. If evidence of transactions is stored in a VM
in the form of a transaction log, this can be lost if the state of a
VM is restored. If transactions are signed, the key with which
this is done is also stored on the VM, and can thus be copied.
Therefore, even if the digital signature appears valid, we are
not entirely sure which machine actually put the signature.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the results of a literature study on the
effects of virtualization technology. As a whole, virtualization
has positive effects on availability, but at the same time
it threatens confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-
repudiation, even though many features are designed with
these goals in mind.
Some core features of virtualization (isolation between
processes and small footprint) have clear positive effects on
most security properties, but it is clear that these effects are
mitigated by newer features built on top of these. These
additional features make the VMM layer bloated [13], and
create an additional level of complexity, causing three prob-
lems: first, they increase the amount of code and therefore
the likelihood of bugs, which is (amongst other things) what
makes operating system security so hard to achieve. Secondly,
they making misuse more easy by giving much more control
to the administrators. Thirdly, they lead to the emergent
properties of loss of uniqueness, location boundedness and
monotonicity.
Especially because the technology is widely deployed, these
security problems are surprising, which might underscore the
need for further research, especially in the form of case
studies regarding current practices in enterprises, for example
examining how VM integrity is maintained in practice.
However, whatever the outcome of these case studies might
be, we believe that there is a fundamental limit as to what
safely can be virtualized, in order to have adequate security.
If we imagine a completely virtualized system, where the audit
trails of the VMMs, the identity of the administrators, and the
DNS servers no longer have a fixed physical basis, there is no
single system from which to build trust as all systems becomes
fluid. This should be a core concern for everyone building data
centers, clouds or running web applications on top of them.
A. Recommendations
In this final section, several recommendations are discussed,
concerning how to develop and use virtualization technology
with security in mind.
1) Virtualization technology design: We propose to limit
the possibilities for introspection and intervention of VMMs,
such that they cannot affect the application (threatening in-
tegrity) and cannot steal data from them (threatening confi-
dentiality). Especially in outsourcing scenarios this is useful,
because the insourcer should not have full control over the
outsourcer’s data. If virtualization really is just an infrastruc-
ture layer, its functionality can simply focus on availability.
In such a situation, the VM applications “float” on top of the
virtualization layer, that only sustains it without interfering.
An alternative is to split features between different VMMs
running on different physical machines. The majority of
VMMs then focus on availability, allowing high availability of
the applications, while a second category of VMMs has ex-
tensive intervention and introspection features, and contribute
to increased confidentiality and integrity. The latter VMMs
would be only be capable of checking the VM and conferring
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the result to a VMMM, for example to run a virus scan,
without being able to transfer a VM image, being limited
by the physical design of the network. Such a setup would
minimize the impact of security breaches.
2) Application design: Earlier we noted that applications
inside VMs are typically programmed to run continuously, as
they are when running on physical machines. Considering the
problems of bookkeeping in a virtualized infrastructure, the
question can be raised whether applications running inside
VMs should be redesigned to facilitate batch processing and
checkpointing. A single run of a VM (from begin to end of a
job) can then be validated as a whole.
3) Virtualization deployment and management: As a whole,
the virtualization technology has many features in common
with operating systems, but is generally much more powerful.
An individual operating system can do load balancing on one
physical machine, controlling several CPUs and processes,
but a VMMM exerts control over many physical servers.
Operating systems can create restore points and rollback
patches, but only with virtualization is a complete rollback
possible, which leaves no trace of the previous state. Operating
systems can also debug applications and run virus scans, but
only virtualization allows for the complete inspection of virtual
machines, with all its data and all its processes.
If anything, the management of this infrastructure should
therefore be more strictly organized than a physical one.
Changes are easier to execute and harder to keep track of.
Gigabytes of VM data are flowing between physical servers
and a stolen VM image can be readily used elsewhere.
In fact, the VMM infrastructure should be considered to be
a complete machine in itself, similar to a mainframe, of which
all the parts are connected. Such a machine should be put in
one physical location, with tight security controls.
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